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My dissertation investigates the effects of the timing of team reward 
allocation on team relational norms. The main theoretical point is that the timing at 
which team members decide on reward allocation activates different relational 
norms. Specifically, I hypothesize that 1) upfront reward allocation activates a 
market pricing relational norm, whereas 2) delayed reward allocation activates a 
communal sharing relational norm (Fiske, 1992). This has consequences on group 
members’ cooperation, effort and conflict. I further hypothesize that the timing of 
team reward allocation is related to 3) cooperation, 4) conflict and 5) effort; these 
effects are mediated by the activation of relational norms. I investigate this 
phenomenon over two studies. A cross-sectional survey with focal founders and 
co-owners of 43 ventures found that delayed equity split agreements were, contrary 
to my predictions, marginally associated with greater market pricing relational 
norms and significantly associated with greater conflict. A laboratory experiment 
manipulating the timing of team reward allocations with 264 undergraduates (88 
teams) found that delayed reward allocation increased market pricing relational 
norms, decreased conflict and increased effort. Results from the studies indicate 
that there might be other possible boundary conditions surrounding the impact of 
reward timings on team processes and outcomes.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Organizations use work teams to handle complex tasks more frequently than 
ever (Guzzo & Shea, 1992; Guzzo & Dickson, 1996). To enhance the effectiveness 
of work teams, organizations have adapted compensation schemes to include team-
based reward structures (DeMatteo, Eby & Sundstrom, 1998). These rewards often 
come in the form of monetary bonuses that serve to elicit desirable behaviors from 
team members by setting norms. Some of the positive outcomes of team-based 
reward structures include greater cooperation (Bamberger & Levi, 2009), increased 
effort (Zenger & Marshall, 2000) and more knowledge sharing (Bartol & Srivastava, 
2002) among team members.  
Team-based reward structures activate team norms that guide team 
members’ expectations on what behaviors are appropriate (Beersma et al., 2003; 
Leventhal, 1976; Tjosvold, 1986). These rewards can be allocated according to 
equity, equality or need, hence resulting in different norms being activated (Deutsch, 
1975). For example, a collective reward structure which allocates incentives and 
bonuses equally among every team member facilitates the emergence of a 
cooperative norm, as team members cooperate and help each other complete the 
team tasks and challenges in order to obtain the collective reward (Bamberger & 
Levi, 2009). On the other hand, an individualistic reward structure which allocates 
rewards according to individual contribution facilitates the emergence of a 
competitive team norm, as each team member exert greater individual effort in 




1976). Therefore, team-based reward structures play a huge role in determining the 
team norms that guide appropriate behavior. 
A hitherto unexplored feature of team-based rewarding is the timing at 
which reward allocations are made known to team members and its ensuing 
influence on team relational norms. In most empirical studies on team-based reward 
structures, team members are aware of how much reward they can obtain before 
they embark on the task; whether it is piece-meal and unequally allocated, or 
whether it’s collective and equally distributed (e.g. Bamberger & Levi, 2009; 
Nalbantian & Schotter, 1997). However, team members do not always have prior 
knowledge of allocations. This is especially so for self-managed autonomous teams 
that typically set their own task allocations and responsibilities (Sundstrom, De 
Meuse, & Futrell, 1990; Wall, Kemp, Jackson, & Clegg, 1986; Wellins et al., 1990). 
An example of a highly autonomous work team is an entrepreneurial team. Some 
entrepreneurial teams defer discussion of allocation terms until after they have 
discovered each other’s skills, whereas other teams agree upfront on the proportion 
of equity each stakeholder is entitled to (Hellmann & Wasserman, in press; 
Hellmann & Thiele, 2015). There are also instances where academics and scientists 
start working on projects without discussing authorship order or patenting rights, 
whereas others determine authorship at the outset and allocate tasks accordingly. 
However, researchers who study team rewards rarely document and report the 
timing at which allocations were made known to group members (Levinthal, 1976), 
and we know little about the differential effects of rewards at various stages of a 




I draw on relational models theory (Fiske, 1992) to explain how and why 
the timing at which teams discuss and agree on reward allocations can influence the 
way team members behave towards each other. Fiske’s (1992) relational models 
theory suggests that situational contexts, like the approach towards team rewards 
allocations, can activate different schemata and scripts that dictate how team 
members interact with each other and construe their relationships. I propose that an 
upfront discussion and allocation of monetary rewards signals a transactional 
working relationship because of the salience of monetary rewards. This activates a 
market pricing relational norm among team members, leading to an emphasis on 
self-interests (Mossholder, Richardson, & Settoon, 2011), hence resulting in lower 
cooperation, greater conflict and lower effort. On the other hand, I propose that a 
delayed discussion of monetary rewards signals a communal working relationship 
because of the salience of social rewards. This activates a communal sharing 
relational norm, leading to an emphasis on the fulfilment of mutual needs, hence 
resulting in greater cooperation, lower conflict, and greater effort. I test my 
hypotheses with 1) a field survey of venture founders and co-owners, and 2) a 
laboratory experiment manipulating the timing of reward allocations. In the first 
study, I examine the relationship between the timing at which venture owners 
decide on equity splits and its relationship with venture team relational norms 
(cooperation, conflict, and effort). In the second study, I investigate the causality of 
timing of team reward allocations on team relational norms (cooperation, conflict, 




Contributions of Dissertation 
My research contributes to the literatures of team rewards and social 
relations in a number of ways. First, there has been very limited empirical research 
investigating the impact of the timing team rewards on team processes (Leventhal, 
1976; DeMatteo, Eby & Sundstrom, 1998). The frequency of rewards has been 
suggested to have an influence on team processes (DeMatteo, Eby & Sundstrom, 
1998; Vroom, 1964; Yukl, Wexley, & Seymore, 1972). However, team dynamics 
and preferences evolve over time, as suggested by temporal theories of team 
development (McGrath, 1991; Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977). 
Therefore, team rewards have been suggested to cause differential effects on team 
processes depending on the developmental stage of the team (DeMatteo, Eby & 
Sundstrom, 1998; Leventhal, 1976). An acceptable allocation at an early stage 
might be seen as unfair when teams mature and members start to notice different 
levels of contributions. However, other than anecdotal evidence1 and theoretical 
arguments, there has not been much empirical evidence investigating the effects of 
reward allocation timing on team processes. My research extends the literature of 
team rewards by showing that the timing of reward allocations, independent of the 
allocation rule, can influence team processes via the activation of social relational 
norms.  
Second, I extend the relational models theory (Fiske, 1992) by suggesting 
that coordinated actions like the timing of rewards discussion can activate one of 
                                                 
1 Leventhal (1976) recounted how George Washington deferred the allocation of ranks to militia 




the four relational schemas. According to Fiske (1992), more empirical research is 
required to understand how people transit from one relational schema to another. 
My research indicates that the discussion of monetary rewards at the beginning of 
an interaction can be one way that activates relational schemas.  
Lastly, my research also contributes to the literature on the temporal nature 
of teams. McGrath’s (1991) time, interaction and performance model stated that “a 
given type of act may involve different meanings (i.e. different modes and functions), 
depending on the circumstances under which it occurs.” I propose that the timing 
of team reward allocations sets the tone for how team members interact. This is 
consistent with Tuckman’s model of group developmental process (Tuckman, 1965; 
Tuckman & Jensen, 1977), which states that teams first go through a phase of norms 
development (norming) before engaging in the group task (performing). Hence, my 





Chapter 2 - Relational Models Theory 
Relational models theory suggests that there are four distinct models of 
social schema that can be activated in every form of social interaction (Fiske, 1992). 
These are communal sharing, authority ranking, equality matching, and market 
pricing. Communal sharing relationships are characterized by high levels of 
cooperation and sense of shared fate where team members act in concert for the 
collective good. Authority ranking relationships operate with clearly defined roles 
and responsibilities, typically observed in teams with clear hierarchies and leader 
member roles. Equality matching relationships focus heavily on maintaining 
equality between members in terms of rewards received. Finally, market pricing 
relationships feature a transactional system which matches the input (or reward) of 
team members for a commensurate amount of output (or effort) according to the 
same ratio of a reference group.  
Though the four models are defined as distinct, Fiske (1992) suggests that 
people might combine them as elementary blocks to construe different aspects and 
domains of their daily social interactions. Depending on the situation, each model 
might emerge as the most salient form. For example, a communal sharing relational 
model is manifested when team members share resources and tools with each other; 
an authority ranking relational model is depicted by the assignment of tasks by 
leaders to team members; an equality matching relational model is manifested when 
rest and leisure time is allocated equally among team members; a market pricing 
relational model is illustrated by the division of rewards and incentives according 




When discussing the applications of relational models theory in everyday 
life, Fiske (1992) proposed that individuals alternate between the four different 
relational schemas. However, it is unclear what triggers these changes. 
Developmental psychology stipulates that a child first goes through the stage of 
communal sharing as they identify with their caregivers; next, they recognize 
parents as authority figures in authority ranking relationships; fairness and equality 
concerns start to take center-stage as the child reaches around 6 years of age (Hook 
& Cook, 1979); and finally, they start to grasp the concept of economic exchange 
as they grow out of preadolescence (market pricing). However, this linear temporal 
maturation sequence does not hold true for many other social interactions. For 
example, a supplier-buyer relationship starts off as a market pricing relationship as 
they deal in economic transactions. Over repeated successful interactions, they 
develop trust and heightened relational quality, thus evolving into a communal 
sharing relationship. Indeed, Fiske echoed the sentiment that “very little is known 
about the transformations from one mode to another” and urged more empirical and 
theoretical research to investigate when and how each relational model is activated. 
There is empirical evidence to validate aspects of the relational models 
theory. When participants made social errors (e.g. misnaming a person or 
attributing an action or event to a wrong person), they tend to do so along the 
taxonomy of the four relational models (i.e. mixing up the names of two peers who 
have the same relational model with the focal participant) (Fiske, Haslam & Fiske, 
1991). Even though relational models theory was first conceptualized from an 




applicable across all societies and cultures. Indeed, the finding on social errors was 
replicated with participants across four different cultures (Fiske, 1993).  
Neurological effects in support of relational models theory have also been 
found. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), researchers found 
that participants exposed to video clips of social interactions depicting communal 
sharing relationships and authority ranking relationships activated overlapping 
brain regions. However, the two clips elicited different levels of brain activity, with 
the authority ranking interaction eliciting a stronger reaction (Iacoboni et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, compared to viewing clips of the same actor not engaging in social 
interactions and compared to a rest state (no stimuli), there was more brain activity 
when viewing the two forms of social interaction. This lends further credence to 
relational models theory that there can be different cognitive effects attributable to 
the various relational schemas. Besides empirical evidence, there has also been 
theoretical work surrounding the impact of relational schemas on cooperation 
(Mossholder, Richardson & Settoon, 2011), trust (Sheppard & Sherman, 1998), and 
relational capital among entrepreneurial teams (Blatt, 2009).  
Relational Models Theory in Teams 
Even though relational models theory was proposed to explain how 
individuals construe dyadic social interactions, it can be used to understand how 
collectives and teams function. Team interactions can be seen as an aggregation of 
multiple dyadic relationships. Social identity theory suggests that individuals 
within teams identify with each other along the same social categories and 




1979). Participants shown properties of different types of teams could infer 
differences and classify the teams according to the taxonomy of the four relational 
schemas (Lickel et al., 2000). Teams displaying high levels of intimacy were rated 
higher on the communal sharing scale than on the market pricing scale. Cross-
cultural research found that people of the same culture held similar values of 
communal sharing (collectivism), authority ranking (vertical relationships), 
equality matching (horizontal relationships) and market pricing (individualism) 
(Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). Research on social norms suggests that teams often 
ascribe to a set of implicit rules and schemas that guides interaction behaviors 
(Cialdini & Trost, 1998). In the following section, I discuss how the activation of 
social norms can explain how teams come to adopt varying relational models.  
Activation of Social Norms – A Relational Models Approach 
Social norms are defined as “rules and standards that are understood by 
members of a group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the 
force of laws” (Cialdini & Trost, 1998). Social norms serve as an informal system 
that governs actions that are appropriate within teams by sanctioning violations and 
rewarding adherence (Birenbaum & Sagarin, 1976; Sherif, 1936; Stewart, 
Courtright, & Barrick, 2012). These norms emerge as team members interact with 
each other, resolving conflicts if they have any, and ultimately coming to an 
agreement on expectations (Feldman, 1984; Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1985; 
1991). Violators who display incongruent behavior potentially face social penalties 




Social norms can be activated by situational contexts. For instance, framing 
dilemmas with an economic context elicits self-interest norms and reduced 
cooperation levels as compared to framing dilemmas with a non-economic context 
(Pillutla & Chen, 1999). Participants display more moral behaviors when asked to 
recall the Ten Commandments, but display less moral behaviors when placed in 
economic contexts with financial incentives (Aquino et al., 2009). Altruistic norms 
towards conservation of environmental resources are invoked by reminders of need 
severity and consequences of self’s actions (norms activation model; Schwartz, 
1977). Hence, empirical evidence and theory on activation of social norms suggests 
that situational conditions could be an important trigger for which social relational 
model is ultimately adopted between team members.  
According to Bettenhausen and Murnighan’s (1991) research on intra-team 
norm formation, new team members base their initial actions on norms carried over 
from their previous teams or similar situations. They start to develop new norms 
upon further shared experiences within their new teams. This is consistent with 
Tuckman’s model of group developmental process (Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & 
Jensen, 1977). Therefore, in the context of teams, the context and circumstances 
surrounding initial interactions are likely to set the tone for the social norms and 
relational model that will dictate how team members behave subsequently. 
Social relational models serve a similar function of social norms – 
maintaining relationships and guiding appropriate behaviors. Relational models 
theory suggests that all parties in a certain relational model, be it communal sharing 




1992). Social exchange theory corroborates this view, by stating that two parties 
persist in an exchange relationship only if rewards of the exchange exceed the costs. 
If there is incongruence in the perceptions of the relationship, the relationship 






Chapter 3 – Application of Relational Models Theory in Team Rewards 
Looking at the mode of exchange, communal sharing, authority ranking, 
and equality matching relationships can be categorized as a form of social exchange, 
whereas market pricing relationships can be categorized as a form of monetary or 
economic exchange (Blau, 1964). Past empirical research has used the two 
categories of communal sharing and market pricing as two different sources of 
motivation for effort (Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Yam, Bumpus & Hill, 2012). 
Heyman & Ariely (2004) suggested that paying undergraduates in return for their 
participation in research projects activated market pricing motivations, whereas not 
paying participants activated communal sharing motivations; Yam and colleagues 
(2012) found an additive effect of communal sharing and market pricing 
motivations when they provided extra credits instead of cash for participation, as 
participants construe their participation as both helping in research projects as well 
as an economic exchange for credits fulfilment. In my research, I focus on these 
two forms of exchanges (market pricing and communal sharing) as mechanisms for 
how the timing of reward allocation influences team outcomes.  
In market pricing relational models, the emphasis is on equity and self-
interests (Mossholder, Richardson & Settoon, 2011). An upfront discussion of team 
rewards can activate a market pricing relation norm for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
teams that start off their initial interactions with discussions of monetary rewards 
and what each member should do in order to obtain the rewards can invoke an 
economic framing to the purpose of their work together (Pillutla & Chen, 1999). 




salient, encouraging team members to calculate how much effort they should exert 
according to the reward that they are receiving and also relative to the amounts that 
their peers are receiving. Secondly, an upfront discussion encourages team 
members to reveal their personal preferences for equity based allocations (Deutsch, 
1975; Leventhal, 1976). As team members are new to each other, they have not had 
time to develop an in-group identity when reward discussions are done upfront. 
People tend to exhibit more equity concerns when dealing with outgroup members 
(Leung & Bond, 1984). Based on these arguments, I propose that an upfront 
discussion of team rewards allocation activates a market pricing relational norm 
among team members.  
In communal sharing relationships, there is a high level of caring for each 
other’s needs. A delayed discussion of team rewards is more likely to activate a 
communal sharing relational norm due to the following reasons. The process of 
sense-making directs team members to attribute social rewards as motivators 
when monetary rewards are not salient (Heyman & Ariely, 2004; Weick, Sutcliffe 
& Obstfeld, 2005). As monetary incentives are not highlighted, team members 
might focus on completing the task as a shared social responsibility, instead of 
viewing it as a transaction. Furthermore, the absence of a discussion about 
monetary rewards at the beginning of a team’s interaction inhibits self-interest 
norms and encourages other-interest norms like prosocial or altruistic norms 
(Batson, 1987; Rioux & Penner, 2001). Extrinsic rewards have been found to 
undermine intrinsic motivations like altruism or prosocial behavior (Ariely, 




seek to avoid being labeled as self-serving by displaying prosocial behaviors in 
order to earn larger rewards. Therefore, without specifying upfront how rewards 
will be distributed, intrinsic motives like altruism are allowed to emerge. This 
would invoke a communal sharing relational model. 
There is also support for these arguments from other relational theories, of 
which the most widely utilized is social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). Social 
exchange theory stipulates that there are social exchange relationships and 
negotiated exchange relationships. Negotiated exchange relationships typically 
occur between strangers who explicitly discuss terms of an exchange before 
engaging in the transaction. In social exchange relationships, exchange terms are 
implicit and ambiguous. (Blau, 1964; Flynn, 2005). An upfront discussion is akin 
to a negotiated exchange relationship where terms are discussed before effort is 
exerted (market pricing relational model), whereas a delayed discussion is akin to 
a social exchange relationship where terms are ambiguous initially (communal 
sharing relational model). Therefore, I make the following hypotheses: 
H1: Upfront allocation of rewards is positively related to market pricing 
relational norm, whereas delayed allocation of rewards is negatively related 
to market pricing relational norm. 
H2: Upfront allocation of rewards is negatively related to communal sharing 
relational norm, whereas delayed allocation of reward is positively related 




The Outcomes of Market Pricing and Communal Sharing Relational Models 
Through activated relational norms, the timing of reward allocations can 
have differential effects on intra-team cooperation. Group cooperative norms have 
been found to lead to greater cooperation among team members (Chatman & Flynn, 
2001; Ehrhart & Naumann, 2004; Gonzalez-Mulé et al., 2014). In a team with 
market pricing relational norms activated by upfront reward allocation, there is a 
lower likelihood to engage in cooperative behavior. Team members in market 
pricing relationships act according to self-interests and put themselves first ahead 
of others. This transactional approach makes team members more self-oriented and 
less willing to help others in their work, as they are focused on completing their 
own tasks. Indeed, research has shown that activating the concept of money reduced 
sociability and led to lower helping behavior towards others (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 
2006). Also, in teams which embraces market pricing social norms, tasks tend to 
be individually delineated, reducing the likelihood of cooperation (Haslam & Fiske, 
1999). Hence, allocating rewards upfront is likely to lead to lower cooperation via 
the activation of market pricing relational norms. 
On the contrary, in a team with communal sharing relational norms, team 
members will be more helpful and cooperative towards each other as they care more 
about the collective well-being (Clark & Mills, 1979). Teams with communal 
sharing relational norms are characterized by collective responsibilities, equal 
sharing of resources and a sense of shared fate (Haslam & Fiske, 1999). Employees 
who perceive a communal sharing relational climate are more trusting of each other 




to display helping behaviors (Mossholder, Richardson & Settoon, 2011). Therefore, 
delayed allocation of rewards is likely to lead to greater cooperation via the 
activation of communal sharing relational norms. 
Hypothesis 3: Upfront allocation of team rewards is negatively associated 
with cooperation; delayed allocation of team rewards is positively associated 
with cooperation. 
Hypothesis 4a: Market pricing relational norms mediate the negative 
relationship between upfront allocation of team rewards and cooperation. 
Hypothesis 4b: Communal sharing relational norms mediate the positive 
relationship between delayed allocation of team rewards and cooperation. 
 Team rewards are often put in place to raise team performance, but conflict 
among team members can undermine this process (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; see 
Van de Vliert et al., 1999 for an exception). Neglecting the timing of team reward 
allocation can have unintended effects on the emergence of intra-team conflict. An 
upfront allocation of team rewards is likely to lead to greater intra-team conflict 
due to lower concern for mutual needs and lower trust as a function of market 
pricing relational norms. Members in market pricing relationships are more likely 
to develop calculus-based trust due to the rational and economic nature of their 
relationships. Calculus-based trust is more easily violated and prone to developing 
conflict than relational-based trust, which is developed as a function of deep 
personalized bonds and repeated interactions facilitated by communal sharing 




 An increased likelihood of perceptions of injustice in teams with market 
pricing relational norms is another factor in why upfront allocation of team rewards 
will result in greater conflict. As there is an emphasis on maintaining equity, any 
misalignment of effort will result in discontent and withdrawal or sabotage 
behaviors (Adams, 1965). On the other hand, teams with communal sharing norms 
as a result of delayed allocation of team rewards have stronger relational ties among 
team members. Thus, they are less likely to experience conflict. Research on social 
networks in organizations found that stronger relational ties led to lower conflict as 
a result of greater contact between members (Nelsen, 1989).  
Hypothesis 5: Upfront allocation of team rewards is positively associated 
with conflict; delayed allocation of team rewards is negatively associated 
with conflict 
Hypothesis 6a: Market pricing relational norms mediate the positive 
relationship between upfront allocation of team rewards and conflict. 
Hypothesis 6b: Communal sharing relational norms mediate the negative 
relationship between delayed allocation of team rewards and conflict. 
Money has often been used to incentivize employees to put in extra effort. 
In fact, giving money is a sure way to elicit an appropriate amount of effort that is 
required, calibrated by the amount of money that is given (Vohs, Mead & Goode, 
2008). When a market pricing relational model is activated with upfront allocation 
of rewards, group members put in effort that is directly proportional to the amount 




in market pricing relationships are strictly rational and engage in actions after a 
careful cost-benefit analysis (Haslam, Nick & Fiske, 1999). Team members will 
also match their effort according to the effort that their peers are receiving. Hence, 
in order to elicit greater effort, more money is required. 
For groups that do not have upfront allocation of rewards, group members 
are more willing to exert additional effort to maintain communal relations. As 
members of a communal relationship have more altruistic motives, they will put in 
more effort than similar others who are incentivized by money. Research by 
Heyman and Ariely (2004) found that not paying participants (communal norms) 
elicited greater effort than paying participants a low amount of money (market 
pricing norms). Cross cultural research also found that participants from 
collectivistic (communal) cultures were less likely to engage in shirking or social 
loafing behavior than participants from individualistic (market pricing) cultures 
(Earley, 1989). In addition, since allocations have not been fixed, the likelihood of 
gaining a larger portion of the team rewards drives team members to exert more 
effort to display their contributions (Vroom, 1964). Therefore, on average, group 
members will exert more effort when team rewards allocations are deferred, than 
when team rewards allocations are upfront.  
Hypothesis 7: Team members’ effort on average will be greater in delayed 
allocation of team rewards than upfront allocation of team rewards 
Hypothesis 8a: Market pricing relational norms mediate the relationship 




Hypothesis 8b: Communal sharing relational norms mediate the relationship 






Chapter 4 – Venture Teams and Equity Splits 
 Venture teams offer a prime context to test my theory as they are good 
examples of autonomous and self-managed work teams. One of the most 
fundamental issue facing founding members of venture teams is how to split equity 
(Hellmann & Wasserman, in press). The outcome of the equity agreement can have 
a great impact on venture members’ social relationships. In a qualitative study of 
entrepreneurial teams, researchers found that low perceived justice of equity splits 
led to negative interaction spirals whereas high perceived justice of equity splits led 
to positive interaction spirals (Breugst, Patzelt, & Rathgeber, 2015).  
Decisions about how and when to split equity can be rather complex in 
venture teams. An asymmetry in skills and competencies can cause founding 
partners to delay equity split agreements, in order to allow time for each other to 
find out more about the complementarity of their skills and potential contributions 
(Hellmann & Thiele, 2015). Do it too quickly, and one risks working with an 
ineffective partner; do it too late, and one risks losing out if the partner chooses to 
work on it with someone else. However, beyond efficiency concerns, there has not 
been any empirical evidence investigating how the timing of equity split 





In this study, I investigate the effects of timing of equity agreements on team 
relational norms and team processes. I study venture teams as their natural setting 
creates an excellent platform to test my theory and has high generalizability to self-
managed work teams.  
Participants and Design 
 Due to the inaccessibility of venture founders and co-owners, I employed a 
convenience sampling and snowball sampling approach. I reached out to various 
incubators, attended networking events, cold-mailed email addresses found online, 
went door-to-door and posted advertisements on social media. The criteria were 
that they had to be the founder or co-founder of the venture, and there had to be 
more than one shareholder. A total of 48 venture co-owners/founders responded 
and took part in a 15 minutes online cross-sectional survey study. 2 ventures were 
excluded because there was only one shareholder. One venture was excluded 
because it was a family business founded by the respondent’s parents. Two entries 
were excluded because they were from the same founding team; I kept the response 
of the lead founder/CEO. Of the remaining 43 ventures, 5 ventures reported 
incomplete information on their demographics and venture age. I will report t-test 
results including these 5 ventures. Regression analyses with demographic 
information as control variables is conducted without the 4 ventures. The average 
age of the founders was 31.9 years and the average age of ventures was 30.3 months. 
Of the 38 ventures with complete demographic information, 33 founders were male 





 Timing of equity agreement. In order to provide a more accurate depiction 
of the range of possible time points of equity agreements, I conducted interviews 
with three venture founders. In those interviews, I focused on three main questions: 
1. When did your team first decide on how to split equity or earnings among your 
team members? 2. How did you and your co-founders decide on the split? 3. When 
do you think other venture teams typically decide on equity agreement?  
The results of the interviews indicated that venture co-founders typically 
make equity agreements at certain milestones. I incorporated these milestones into 
the question for timing of equity agreement. The milestones were idea 
conceptualization stage, internal funding stage, external funding stage, and business 
operations stage. Though they revealed that many formal equity contracts were 
made during business registration, they also acknowledged that informal 
agreements and discussions can be held prior to registration. The outcomes of these 
informal agreements are usually similar to the eventual contractual agreements. 
While all three founders agreed that idea conceptualization stage is the very first 
stage of a new venture, the other stages might differ depending on the industry the 
venture is based in or the type of business. For example, a business dealing with 
mobile apps do not need funding before starting business operations, but a brick 
and mortar café business does. Due to the inability to assume linearity in venture 
milestones, I operationalized timing of equity agreements as a dichotomous 




Participants responded to a single question: “At which stage of the venture 
did your team decide how to allocate earnings/equity among the team members?” 
Possible responses were a. At the beginning, idea conceptualization stage; b. When 
we raised internal funding; c. When we raised external funding d. When we started 
business operations; e. Have not decided yet; f. Others. All participants that chose 
a. At the beginning, were coded with a dummy variable as 0: Upfront and all other 
responses were coded as 1: Delayed. As a secondary check, I also asked two open-
ended questions about the duration and process of equity agreement. The questions 
were “When did your team FIRST decide how to allocate equity among the team 
members? If idea conceptualization is Time 0, approximately how many 
days/weeks/months went by before your team members first agreed on the equity 
split?” and “How did your team decide on the allocation? What was the process 
like? Please briefly explain.” One respondent indicated that they had not discussed 
equity, but yet was able to respond to a latter question about the parameters of the 
equity split and also responded to the open ended question on the duration of the 
equity allocation with “Day 1”, so this entry was coded as Upfront. Results 
remained the same if this entry was dropped from data analyses.  
Market Pricing Relational Norm. Market pricing relational norm was 
measured with a seven-item measure adapted from Haslam and Fiske (1999). The 
frame of reference was shifted to the team, in accordance with referent-shift 
consensus models (Chan, 1998). Sample items include “What benefits each team 
member gets from this team are directly proportional to how much effort they give 




pays or contributes.” Items were rated on a 7 point Likert scale from 1=strongly 
disagree to 7=strongly agree. (α = .80).  
Communal Sharing Relational Norm. Communal sharing relational norm 
was measured with an eight-item measure adapted from Haslam and Fiske (1999). 
Similarly, the frame of reference was shifted to the team (Chan, 1998). Participants 
responded to their perceptions of the norms of their teams on a 7 point Likert scale 
from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. Sample items include “If either 
member needs something, someone gives it without expecting anything in return.” 
and “Many important things we use belong to the team together, not to either 
member separately.” (α = .71).  
Cooperation. Cooperation was measured with a five-item measure 
(Chatman & Flynn, 2001). Sample items include “There is a high level of 
cooperation between team members.”, “There is a high level of sharing between 
team members.” and “There is very little collaboration among team members, tasks 
are individually delineated” (reverse coded). Items were rated on a 7 point Likert 
scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. (α = .65). Removing the 
reverse-coded item increased the coefficient alpha to .81. However, analyses were 
done with all 5 items. 
Conflict. I measured intragroup conflict with two factors of task conflict 
and relationship conflict adapted from Jehn (1995). Task conflict was measured 
with five items that were rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 1=not at all to 7=all 




team?” and “How often did people in your team have conflicting opinions regarding 
the task you were working on?” (α = .90). Relationship conflict was measured with 
three items that were rated on a 7 point Likert scale from 1=not at all to 7=all the 
time. Sample items include “How much relationship tension was there in your 
team?” and “How much emotional conflict was there among members in your 
team?” (α = .89). 
Effort. Effort was measured with a five-item scale adapted from De Jong 
& Elfring (2010) in measuring team effort. Respondents were asked to list their 
team members and evaluate them on their effort displayed. Sample items include 
“This team member work as hard as he/she can to achieve the team’s objectives.” 
and “This team member makes an effort to attain high team performance levels.” 
Items were rated on a 7 point Likert scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly 
agree. (α = .95).  
 Control variables. I measured age, gender, number of team members who 
are shareholders and the venture age as control variables as they might have an 
impact on relational norms (Fiske, 1992). I also controlled for home country and 
industry of the venture. The ventures were distributed across a range of industries: 
information technology, e-commerce, food and beverage, retail, education, 
construction and health etc. An important control variable was whether equity was 
split equally. An equal split of equity has been found to impact venture team 
relationships (Breugst, Patzelt, & Rathgeber, 2015; Hellmann & Wasserman, in 
press). Participants responded to an open-ended question about their equity 




team members in terms of percentages.” I coded the responses with a dummy 
variable indicating equal splits as 1 and unequal splits as 0. In total, there were 27 
venture teams that split equity equally and 15 which split equity unequally; 1 
venture declined to reveal this information.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 summarizes my predictor and control variables, their definitions 
and the questions used in my data collection. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics 
and the pairwise correlations among the empirical variables in this study.  
I checked for sampling bias by comparing venture statistics of venture age, 
team size and equity equal splitting with the sample from Hellmann and 
Wasserman’s (In press) research on division of founder equity in new ventures. 
Their data was obtained from the Annual CompStudy survey of North American 
ventures. My sample is less susceptible to survivorship bias as the average venture 
age is 30.3 months (SD = 25.1), whereas that from Hellmann and Wassmerman’s 
study was 79.4 months (SD = 57.0). The average team size from my sample is 3.04 
(SD = 1.21), comparable with the other study’s (M = 2.77, SD= 1.14). However, 
my sample has a larger proportion of equal equity splits (63.6%) compared with 
that of the reference study (32%). I discuss the implications of this bias in the 
discussion section.  




 First, to test my hypotheses, I conducted an independent sample t-test on 
the key variables of interest between venture teams that decided on equity 
agreements upfront (N = 27) and venture teams that had a delayed agreement (N = 
16). There were no statistically significant differences in market pricing and 
communal sharing relational norms for teams that decided on equity agreements 
upfront and teams that delayed agreement. Hypotheses 1 and 2 were not supported. 
Venture teams that discussed equity upfront reported marginally lower task 
conflict than those that had a delayed discussion of equity (M = 2.66, SD = 0.78 vs 
M = 3.44, SD = 1.53, t(40) = -1.84, p=.08, d=.57 ; there was no homogeneity of 
variance between groups on task conflict as there was a significant difference for 
Levene’s test for equality of variances, so I reported the results for equal variances 
not assumed). Also, venture teams that discussed equity upfront report statistically 
significant lower relationship conflict than those that had a delayed discussion of 
equity (M = 2.44, SD = 0.91 vs M = 3.24, SD = 1.24), t(40) = -2.40, p = .02, d = .74 . 
Therefore, there is no support for hypothesis 5 as results were opposite to my 
predictions.  
There were no statistically significant differences reported for cooperation 
and members’ effort. As such, there is no support for hypotheses 3, 4a, 4b (main 
effects and mediation effects on cooperation), 6a, 6b (mediation effects for conflict), 
7, 8a and 8b (main effects and mediation effects on effort). 
 Next, I conducted a hierarchical regression with timing of equity agreement 




relational norm, cooperation, task conflict, relationship conflict, and effort as 
dependent variables in multiple models to test my hypotheses. The results are 
summarized in Table 3 and 4. The timing of equity agreement was marginally 
significantly associated with market pricing relational norm (B = .63, SE = .36, t(29) 
= 1.75, F(8, 29) = 2.91, R2 = .45, Adjusted R2 = .29, p = .09). The later the timing 
of equity agreement, the greater the market pricing relational norm. However, this 
finding was opposite to hypothesis 1. Also, there was no significant effect of timing 
of equity agreement on communal sharing relational norm. Thus, hypothesis 2 is 
not supported. 
The timing of equity allocation decision making was positively associated 
with relationship conflict (B = .78, SE = .38, t(28) = 2.06, F(8, 28) = 1.43, R2 = .29, 
Adjusted R2 = .09, p = .049). The later the timing of equity agreement, the greater 
the relationship conflict. I tested for mediation of market pricing and communal 
sharing relational norms with PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2013), and did not find any 
mediating effect (bootstrapped confidence intervals of mediation effect included 
zero). Again, hypothesis 5 was not supported because observed effects were in the 
opposite direction. Hypotheses 6b and 6b were also not supported.  
There were no significant effects of timing of equity on cooperation and 
effort. Therefore, there was no support for hypotheses 3, 4a, 4b (main effects and 





Although I did not find main effects of timing of equity agreement on team 
outcomes of cooperation, conflict, and effort, analyses showed that there was 
support for the second stage of the mediation model i.e. effects of relational norms 
on cooperation, conflict and effort. 
Communal sharing relational norm was positively associated with 
cooperation (B = .38, SE = .16, t(27) = 2.42, F(10, 27) = 1.90, R2 = .41, Adjusted 
R2 = .20, p = .02) and negatively associated with relationship conflict (B = -.53, SE 
= .26, t(26) = -2.06, F(10, 26) = 1.66, R2 = .39, Adjusted R2 = .16, p = .049). There 
was no significant relationship between communal sharing relational norm and 
effort. 
 Market pricing relational norm was negatively associated with cooperation 
(B = -.29, SE= .11, t(27) = -2.54, F(10, 27) = 1.90, R2 = .41, Adjusted R2 = .20, p 
= .02) and negatively associated with effort (B = -.52, SE = .19, t(25) = -2.71, F(10, 
25) = 2.05, R2 = .45, Adjusted R2 = .23, p = .01). There was no significant 
relationship between market pricing relational norm and conflict. 
Discussion 
 This study found an effect of timing of equity discussion on intra-team 
conflict and marginal effects on market pricing relational norm. However, both 
effects were opposite to my predictions. This could be due to a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the prior relationships between the founding members might have 
influenced the timing of equity discussion. Co-founders who were not well 




about each other’s skillsets before committing to an equity split (Hellmann & 
Thiele, 2015). Also, they would have established a more exchange-oriented type of 
relationship as they got together solely for the purpose of the business venture 
(Clark & Mills, 1979). On the other hand, co-founders who were close friends, 
family members or spouses would have agreed on an equity split more quickly 
(Hellmann & Wasserman, in press) and gone into the venture with a previously 
established communal relationship. Norms that were established from previous 
relationships are likely to be carried over to their new ventures (Bettenhausen & 
Murnighan, 1991). This would also explain the effect of delayed equity agreements 
on conflict, as co-founders without prior relationships would have been more prone 
to conflict than those who had close or intimate prior relationships. Indeed, there 
was a significant negative correlation between communal sharing relational norm 
and relationship conflict. 
Secondly, there could have been a difference in the number of teams that 
decided to split equity equally between those in the upfront and delayed groups. An 
equal split of equity would be more likely to induce communal sharing relational 
norms whereas an unequal split might induce greater market pricing relational 
norms (Bamberger & Levi, 2009; Deutsch, 1975). However, there was no 
significant correlation between equal splitting of equity and the two relational 
norms. I also conducted a one-way ANOVA with equal split of equity as the 
between teams’ factor and found no significant difference on the two relational 
norms. To further test for differences, I conducted a binary logistics regression with 




the independent variable and all the control variables from the study. Among the 
27 teams that had an upfront equity agreement, 16 teams had an equal equity split 
and 10 teams had an unequal equity split (1 team declined to reveal the information). 
Among the 16 teams that had a delayed equity agreement, 11 teams had an equal 
equity split and 5 teams had an unequal equity split. Results indicated no significant 
relationship between timing of equity agreement and equal splitting of equity 
(Wald= .76, p= .83). The lack of statistically significant differences might be due 
to the small sample size or uneven sample size in the different cells (15 unequal 
splits, 27 equal splits). 
An equal split of equity upfront could have contributed to stronger 
communal norms, whereas an unequal split of equity upfront could have 
contributed to stronger market pricing norms. To test this prediction, I conducted a 
hierarchical linear regression with timing and equal split of equity as an interaction 
term, all the control variables from study 1, and the relational norms as dependent 
variables. However, there were no significant interaction effects of timing and equal 
split of equity on relational norms. Next, I tested for interaction effects on team 
processes. There was a marginal interaction effect between timing and equal split 
of equity on task conflict (B = 1.59, SE = .93, t(27) = 1.71, , R2 = .34, Adjusted R2 
= .12, p = .098). However, the ANOVA results of the regression model indicated 
that the overall model was not significant (F(10, 27) = 1.52, p = .19). Simple slopes 
analysis indicated that at one standard deviation above the mean of equal split of 
equity (i.e. equal split), the effect of timing of reward allocation on relationship 




below the mean of equal split of equity (i.e. unequal split), there was no significant 
effect of timing of reward allocation on task (p = .62). This suggests that when 
upfront equity allocation results in lower task conflict than delayed equity 
allocation when equity is split equally. 
Limitations 
There were several limitations in this study that could have influenced the 
robustness of the findings. Firstly, the sample size was not large enough. Based on 
the small to moderate effect size of r =.32 obtained from the effect of timing of 
equity agreement on market pricing relational norm, an ideal sample size for 
power=.90 and alpha =.05 is 99. However, based on a moderate effect of r = .50, a 
sample size of 38 is sufficient, which is the number of teams in my sample with 
complete information.  
Secondly, the sample was skewed towards equal equity distribution. 63.6% 
of the teams in my sample had equal equity distributions compared to 32% in a 
recent research on equity splits by Hellmann and Wasserman (in press). This could 
be due to cultural differences in collectivism and individualism in the samples. The 
teams from my sample were from predominantly collectivistic cultures (Asian 
countries: Singapore and India), whereas the sample from the reference group was 
from a predominantly individualistic culture (United States), hence explaining the 
greater proportion of equal equity splits in my sample (Leung & Bond, 1984).  
Thirdly, only one member’s response was collected from each team. This 




according to Fiske (1992), people in social relationships have high internal 
agreement on the type of relationship they are engaged in. Inconsistencies would 
have resulted in the termination of the relationships. Therefore, single party 
responses may still be valid, though clearly not optimal. Team size is a bigger 
concern as it is correlated with market pricing relational norms and effort, and also 
display marginally significant correlation with task conflict. However, analysis 
showed no differences in team size between teams who had upfront equity 
agreements and teams who had delayed equity agreements. 
Lastly, as previously discussed, there was no control for prior relationships 
between venture team members before they started the venture. The strength of 
prior relationships might have influenced both the timing of equity agreement and 
on the relational norms of the team; closer relationships can lead to faster equity 
agreements (Hellmann & Wasserman, in press) and stronger communal bonds. I 
attempt to address these limitations in the next study by conducting a laboratory 





Chapter 5 – Laboratory Experiment Manipulating Timing of Team Reward 
Allocations 
Study 2 
In Study 2, I use a laboratory experiment to test for the causal effects of 
reward allocation timing and team relational norms and outcomes. I aim to replicate 
the findings of Study 1 and test my hypotheses in a controlled setting. In this 
experiment, I randomly assigned participants to three-member teams to engage in 
a group task and aim to investigate if my theory holds. Participants in this study 
would be less likely to have any close prior relationships as they would be randomly 
assigned into different teams. Nevertheless, familiarity with team members was still 
controlled for. Also, responses were gathered from all team members, instead of 
single member responses in Study 1. Team size was fixed at three members so there 
would not be any variance in team size across conditions. 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 264 undergraduate business students (88 three-member 
teams; 102 male and 162 female, age M = 20.66, SD = .95) who were participating 
in a subject pool study for course credits. Three teams with two members were 
excluded, though including them in the analyses did not change results. This study 
employs a one-factor between-participants design. For each session, participants in 
the same group were randomly assigned to either the upfront reward allocation, 
delayed reward allocation or control condition. Participants were told that they 
would be participating in a team performance task consisting of 3 members. Before 




tasks. This was done to allow team members a chance to exhibit some initial 
differences in experience and competence on the team task. They were randomly 
assigned to either 1) observe the other two team members, 2) build the highest 
standing structure that they could with Meccano (a building toy) parts, or 3) engage 
in a mini-version of the marshmallow challenge with 10 spaghetti sticks, half a 
meter of tape and half a meter of string. The individual tasks lasted for 3 minutes. 
During the task, team members were not allowed to communicate with each other.  
After completion of the individual task, participants were briefed on the 
team task instructions. Their task is engage in the marshmallow challenge. The 
marshmallow challenge was chosen because it is a highly engaging team activity 
which allows for high variances in cooperation, conflict, and effort to emerge. Their 
task was to build the tallest free standing structure with twenty spaghetti sticks, a 
meter-long string, a meter-long sticky tape and a pair of scissors that can lift up a 
marshmallow as high as possible off the table top. They were told that the team 
with the highest score would win a cash prize of $100. They were administered 
questionnaires after the team task, debriefed and thanked.  
Manipulation 
 Timing of reward allocation. In the upfront reward allocation condition, 
participants were told to decide how to split a $100 cash prize before they started 
working on the team task.  
“The team that builds a free-standing structure that lifts the marshmallow 




how to allocate this cash prize among the team members if your team wins, keeping 
in mind each team member’s contribution to the final product.  
Now, please take 5 minutes to discuss how your team will allocate this prize 
money if your team wins, taking into account each member’s contribution to the 
final product.  
After you have discussed and agreed on the allocation, please fill in the 
details below and provide your signature as proof of agreement.” 
In the delayed reward allocation condition, participants were told to decide 
on the $100 cash prize allocation after they completed working on the team task, 
before filling in surveys. In the control condition, participants did not discuss the 
cash prize allocation until they have completed all surveys. 
Measures 
Market Pricing Relational Norm. As in Study 1, market pricing relational 
norm was measured with a seven-item measure adapted from Haslam and Fiske 
(1999). Again, the frame of reference was shifted to the team (Chan, 1998). Sample 
items include “What benefits each team member gets from this team is directly 
proportional to how much effort they give to the team.” and “This team divides 
things up according to how much each member pays or contributes.” Items were 
rated on a 7 point Likert scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. (α 
= .83).  
Communal Sharing Relational Norm. As in study 1, communal sharing 




and Fiske (1999). Similarly, the frame of reference was shifted to the team (Chan, 
1998). Participants responded to their perceptions of the norms of their teams on a 
7-point Likert scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. Sample items 
include “If either member needs something, someone gives it without expecting 
anything in return.” and “Many important things we use belong to the team together, 
not to either member separately.” (α = .84).  
Cooperation. Cooperation was measured with the same five-item measure 
from study 1 (Chatman & Flynn, 2001). Sample items include “There is a high level 
of cooperation between team members.”, “There is a high level of sharing between 
team members.” and a reverse-coded item “There is very little collaboration among 
team members, tasks are individually delineated.” Items were rated on a 7-point 
Likert scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree. (α = .65). Removing the 
reverse-coded item increased the coefficient alpha to .73. However, analyses were 
done with all 5 items. 
Conflict. In this study, I measured intra-team conflict with the single factor 
of task conflict adapted from Jehn (1995). As in study 1, task conflict was measured 
with five items and items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 1=not at all to 
7=all the time. Sample items include “How much conflict of ideas was there in your 
team?” and “How often did people in your team have conflicting opinions regarding 
the task you were working on?” (α = .90). Relationship conflict was not measured 




Effort. Effort was measured with a five-item scale adapted from De Jong 
& Elfring (2010) in measuring team effort. Respondents were asked to list their 
team members and evaluate them on their effort displayed. Sample items include 
“This team member work as hard as he/she can to achieve the team’s objectives.” 
and “This team member makes an effort to attain high team performance levels.” 
Items were rated on a 7-point Likert scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly 
agree. (α = .86).  
Control variables. Similar to study 1, I measured age, gender and whether 
reward was equally split as control variables. Teams that split the reward equally 
were coded with a dummy variable of 1; teams that had split unequally was coded 
with 0. I also measured the degree of familiarity team members had with each other 
prior to engaging in the study. Responses include 1=never met before, 
2=acquaintance and 3=friend. I created a dummy variable for gender composition 
as there could be four different gender permutations for three member teams. The 
variable was coded as 0 = 3 females, 1 = 1 male 2 female, 2 = 2 males 1 female and 
3 = 3 males. Lastly, I included the score attained on the marshmallow challenge as 
a control variable as the perceived success of the team activity might have a positive 
impact on teamwork quality perceptions (Hoegl, & Gemuenden, 2001).  
Results 
Manipulation Check 
 Prior experience. To test for the effectiveness of the manipulation of prior 




amounts allocated, as participants with greater task experience should be seen as 
more likely to contribute and hence, be allocated larger portions of the reward. 
There were no statistically significant differences on the agreed reward allocation 
amounts between participants who engaged in the three different individual warm 
up tasks. There were also no statistical differences in the reported outcomes on the 
other dependent variables between participants engaging in the three different 
individual warm up tasks. Therefore, the attempt to manipulate initial starting 
differences in experience and perceived competence between the team members 
did not work.  
Timing of reward allocation. Participants responded to a single question 
about the timing of their team reward allocation decision. They were given three 
options: 1= Before completion of group task, 2= After completion of group task, 3= 
Have not discussed. Options were coded as 1 = before starting on the group task 
(upfront), -1 = after completion of group task (delayed), 0 = have not discussed 
(control). I conducted a one-way ANOVA of the aggregated team responses and 
found significant differences between teams in the three different conditions 
(upfront reward allocation condition M = 1, delayed reward allocation condition M 
= -.78, and control condition M = .13, p < .01).  
Support for aggregation 
 In order to justify aggregation, within-group agreement is necessary for the 
justification of referent-shift consensus models (Chan, 1998). In addition to 




form of interrater reliability, I also computed intraclass correlation ICC(1) and 
ICC(2) (James, 1982).  For rwg(j), a value of 0.70 and above is acceptable. For 
ICC(1), values tend to range between 0.05 and 0.20, whereas for ICC(2), a value of 
0.60 and above is recommended (Bliese, 2000; Glick, 1985). 
 The average rwg(j) for communal sharing relational norm was 0.97, ICC(1) 
= .04, ICC(2) = 0.11. As for market pricing relational norm, the average rwg(j) for 
was 0.72, ICC(1) = -0.01, ICC(2) = -0.05. For this measure, even though within-
group agreement meets the acceptable value of 0.70, the negative ICC values 
indicate greater within-group variance than between-group variance. This could be 
caused by the small between-group variance introduced by the control condition. 
As the meaningful analysis is the comparison between the two treatment groups, I 
conducted another computation for the same interrater reliability indices by 
excluding measurements from the control group. This time, the average rwg(j) for 
market pricing relational norm was 0.73, ICC(1) = 0.06, ICC(2) = 0.17. The low 
ICC(1) and ICC(2) values can be attributed to the low number of raters. However, 
there is high within-group agreement (0.97 and 0.70), hence supporting aggregation 
(Chan, 1998). Thus, I conduct analyses on both aggregated values of communal 
sharing and market pricing relational norms.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics and the pairwise correlations 
between the variables. The timing of reward allocation was coded with -1 for 




There is a marginal negative correlation between timing of reward allocation and 
market pricing relational norm. Conflict is positively correlated with timing of 
reward allocation, while effort is negatively correlated. Communal sharing 
relational norm is positive correlated with cooperation and effort, and negatively 
correlated with conflict.  
Tests of Hypotheses 
There were no differences between teams in the three conditions on average 
age, degree of unequal reward splits (2 teams in delayed condition; 3 teams in 
control condition; 3 teams in upfront condition), familiarity, score attained on the 
team task and gender composition. See Table 6 for a summary of the control 
variables between the three experimental conditions.  
To test my hypotheses, I conducted a one-way ANOVA with contrast 
coding to compare the differences in teams between the three conditions. (See 
Figures 1-3 for results of statistically significant findings). Teams in the delayed 
reward allocation condition reported marginally significant greater market pricing 
relational norm than teams in the upfront reward allocation condition (M = 4.54, 
SD = .68 vs M = 4.26, SD = .68, p= .08; d = .46); there was also a significantly 
greater reported market pricing relational norm than teams in the control condition 
(M = 4.54, SD = .68 vs M = 4.07, SD = .39, p=.003; d = .78). There were no 
statistical differences in market pricing relational norm between teams in the 
upfront reward allocation condition and teams in the control condition (p=.22). 




sharing relational norm. I repeated the analyses with disaggregated data at the 
individual level and the results remained the same. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is 
supported, but hypothesis 2 is not supported. 
Teams in the delayed reward allocation condition reported experiencing 
lower task conflict than teams in the upfront discussion (M = 1.60, SD = .34 vs M 
= 1.81, SD = .35, p = .02; d = .64). Also, teams in the upfront reward allocation 
condition reported marginally significant higher task conflict than teams in the 
control condition (M = 1.81, SD = .35 vs M =1.64, SD = .29, p = .052, d = .52). 
There were no statistical differences between conflict reported by teams in the 
delayed reward allocation condition and teams in the control condition (p = .63). 
However, neither market pricing nor communal sharing relational norms mediated 
the effect of allocation timing on conflict. This set of findings provides support for 
hypotheses 5, but no support for hypotheses 6a and 6b. 
Teams in the delayed reward allocation condition reported greater effort by 
team members than teams in the upfront reward allocation condition (M = 6.36, SD 
= .34 vs M = 6.15, SD = .32, p = .02; d = .60). There were no statistical differences 
between effort of team members reported by teams in the upfront reward allocation 
condition and teams in the control condition (M = 6.23, SD = .37, p = .37). There 
were also no statistical differences between effort of team members reported by 
teams with a delayed discussion and teams in the control condition (p = .17). Using 
PROCESS macro to test for mediation, neither market pricing nor did communal 




(Hayes, 2013). This set of findings provides support for hypotheses 7, but no 
support for hypotheses 8a and 8b. 
Analyses showed no differences between the three conditions on 
cooperation. Therefore, hypotheses 3, 4a and 4b (main effects and mediation effects 
on cooperation) were not supported. 
Discussion 
 The results of this study showed no support for hypotheses 1 and 3. Study 
2 found that delayed allocation of team rewards was marginally associated with 
greater market pricing relational norms and no significant effect on cooperation. 
Therefore, there is insufficient evidence to support hypothesis 1 and 3. Findings for 
hypotheses 5 and 7 were more robust. Results showed that upfront team reward 
allocations led to greater perceived intra-team conflict and lower perceived effort 
by team members.  
 Even though there was weak evidence showing that delayed team reward 
allocation led to greater market pricing relational norms, this result is consistent 
with the findings of Study 1. Participants from this study were culturally similar to 
the sample from Study 1.  
 This study found evidence to support the hypotheses that upfront reward 
allocations led to greater intra-team conflict and lower team member effort. Study 





 This study addressed the limitations of study 1 by accounting for 
relationships between team members and experimentally manipulating timing of 
reward allocations to test for causality. However, there were still some limitations 
for this study. First, there was a limited amount of time for the teams to interact. 
Hence, participants might have developed different relational norms if they had 
more time to interact or if they participated in repeated tasks. Responses might have 
reflected participants’ natural relational schemas instead of capturing the team’s 
social norm. However, this issue would be addressed by random assignment and 
there should not be any differences observed between conditions. Moreover, there 
was high within-group agreement on responses towards the relational norms. 
Future studies can investigate whether relational norms change over time and over 
repeated interactions. 
Second, there was no clear link between effort and reward accumulation. 
Putting in more effort in a creative task does not necessitate greater contribution. 
This might have resulted in the large majority of equal splits (80 out of 88 teams). 
The lack of perceived instrumentality makes it difficult for market pricing relational 
norms to emerge, as effort could not be objectively measured and subjective 
measures were employed instead. However, this study still managed to capture 
some differences in market pricing relational norms, although the differences were 
marginally significant. 
Third, relationship conflict was not measured in this study due to the short 




conflict and relationship conflict found that both types of conflict had negative 
associations with team performance, with relationship conflict have the greater 
negative effect (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003). An experiment that involves a longer 
period of interaction will be able to uncover the effects of timing of reward 








Chapter 6 - General Discussion 
The activation of team norms by the timing of reward allocation is an 
unexpected feature of team-based reward structures. Across two studies, I found 
some evidence that delayed allocation of rewards is associated with greater market 
pricing relational norms. Although this was contrary to what I hypothesized, the 
finding seems aligned with research on cross-cultural differences. In collectivistic 
cultures, there are stronger preferences for egalitarian and needs-based distribution 
of resources (Kim, Park & Suzuki, 1990; Leung & Bond, 1984). Cultural values 
like collectivism might be a potential boundary condition, such that in highly 
collectivistic cultures, there is an implicit preference to split rewards and equity 
equally upfront, whereas in highly individualistic cultures, the preference is to have 
a delayed agreement on rewards and equity such that there is sufficient time for 
individual differences in contribution and skills to emerge.  
The content of allocation discussion can possibly play a major role in 
deciding what relational norms are activated in teams. Early allocation of rewards 
can be equality or equity-based (Deutsch, 1975). An equality-based early allocation 
can create greater communal sharing or equality-matching relational norms, 
whereas an equity-based early allocation can create greater market-pricing 
relational norms. Although I did not find evidence for this effect in my studies, 
further research is required to ascertain whether this prediction is true. An 
alternative explanation for delayed allocation of rewards leading to greater market-
pricing relational norms could be due to fear and anxiety about being left out of the 




contributions and earn their rights to their portion of the rewards, leading to a 
greater association with market-pricing relational norms. This prediction 
corroborates my findings that delayed allocations led to greater effort.  
I also found that in venture teams, delayed discussion of equity is associated 
with greater relationship conflict. Interestingly, in a laboratory experiment, teams 
which had a delayed allocation of team rewards reported experiencing lower task 
conflict, which is aligned with my predictions. However, even though task conflict 
and relationship conflict are conceptually distinct, meta-analysis found that both 
task conflict and relationship conflict are negatively correlated with team 
performance, with relationship conflict having a stronger negative effect (De Dreu 
& Weingart, 2005). The opposite findings in study 1 could be due to the strength 
of prior relationships, such that team members without strong relationships were 
more likely to delay equity agreements (Hellmann & Thiele, 2015) and encounter 
more relationship conflict. In Study 2, I experimentally manipulate timing of 
reward allocations and accounted for prior relationships, thus mitigating 
unobserved endogenous factors. I found that upfront discussions of reward 
allocations among strangers were more likely to lead to greater task conflict than 
delayed discussions. However, relationship conflict was not measured in the study. 
It might be likely that delayed reward allocations suppress divergent personal 
opinions and negative reactions as team members seek to portray a positive self-
image to minimize jeopardizing their portion of the rewards, but strain and 
exhaustion surfaces as a result of this suppression (also known as surface acting), 




Though not directly studied in this research, justice perceptions are 
paramount to topics revolving around team rewards or equity splits in venture teams. 
Distributive justice concerns or equity – whether one is rewarded fairly relative to 
one’s peers (Adams, 1965) – has been found to have a direct positive impact on 
social interactions within entrepreneurial teams (Breugst, Patzelt, & Rathgeber, 
2015). Procedural justice concerns – whether the process of allocating rewards is 
fair – has also been found to influence work performance, job satisfaction and 
helping behaviors (see Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001 and Colquitt et al., 2001 
for a comprehensive review). Perceived distributive and procedural justice can have 
an interactive effect on the relationship between market pricing relational norms 
and effort, such that the relationship is positive when there is high perceived 
distributive and/or procedural justice.  
In terms of eventual team performance, it seems favorable to delay team 
reward allocations if greater effort is desired. The expectancy of greater rewards 
and the need to maintain positive impressions will increase effort and decrease 
conflict. However, in the long term, this suppression of opinions might be 
detrimental and lead to greater exhaustion, ultimately even straining relationships, 
as found in study 1 where delayed equity splits were associated with greater 
relationship conflict. On the other hand, an upfront team reward allocation can be 
beneficial if it was done on an equality or need basis (Deutsch, 1975), hence 
eliciting greater communal sharing norms. Indeed, I found evidence that an upfront 




However, not all task conflict is detrimental, as constructive conflict can be helpful 
in problem solving and generating creative solutions (Van de Vliert et al., 1999).  
Practical Implications 
Organizations use team-based reward structures to enhance the productivity 
of teams. Configuring compensation schemes to factor in team performance on top 
of individual performance motivates employees to work collaboratively to achieve 
greater team performance. However, social loafing is a peril of teamwork, as 
individual effort is less identifiable in teams (Karau & Williams, 1993). In response, 
organizations designed a hybrid incentive structure that incorporates the evaluation 
of both individual performance and team performance (Pearsall, Christian & Ellis, 
2010). However, team preferences and dynamics evolve over time. What seems 
motivating and rewarding at one developmental stage might appear demotivating 
and unfair at a later stage. The issue of when to allocate rewards among team 
members remains unresolved. 
 Providing rewards upfront can be less expensive for organizations. People 
prefer smaller immediate rewards due to temporal discounting of future gains 
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'donoghue, 2002). The longer the delay between input 
and reward, the greater the reward is required to fulfil the same utility as an 
immediate reward. Providing rewards upfront can be more motivating if it helps 
increase instrumentality perceptions (Vroom, 1964). From another perspective, 
delaying the allocation of rewards can provide greater motivation if there is an 




the uncertainty of delayed allocations can motivate effort during the pursuit of team 
goals (Shen, Fishbach & Hsee, 2015), more so especially if uncertain allocations 
are potentially larger. Therefore, there is no clear verdict whether allocating 
rewards upfront or delayed is better for organizations. 
Future directions 
Future research can explore whether the content of reward allocation 
decision has an interactive effect with the timing of reward allocation on the four 
relational norms of communal sharing, equality matching, authority ranking and 
market pricing (Fiske, 1992). The decision to split rewards equally versus equitably 
can have differential impact on team relational norms. Splitting rewards equally 
upfront may result in greater equality matching relational norms; need-based 
allocations might result in greater communal sharing norms; equity-based 
allocations might result in greater authority ranking or market pricing norms 
depending on whether it was done according to status or ability. Another idea 
worthy of further investigation is: what influences people’s decision to split upfront 
or delayed? People who have high equity concerns might perceive upfront 
allocations as fairer, as they can match their effort to their expected rewards. 
Upfront reward allocation can also generate greater satisfaction to the extent that it 
increases role clarity and team coordination. Allocating greater amounts to 
members with higher ability and potential to contribute would be perceived as being 
fairer. However, this requires careful calibration and forecasting of performance.  
 Gender can be an individual difference that can influence how much people 




self-construal (Cross & Madson, 1997) and have greater communal tendencies, 
putting the group’s interest ahead of their own. They are less sensitive to equity 
ratios than men (Major, Bylsma & Cozzarelli, 1989) and will put in greater effort, 
attain higher accuracy and produce higher quality work than men for the same 
amount of reward (Major, McFarlin & Gagnon, 1984). In a market pricing 
relational model, people are highly sensitive to the ratio of their inputs to what they 
would receive in return. However, since women are less sensitive to such ratios, 
they will exert greater effort than men, whereas men will seek to accurately match 
their effort to the reward that they are allocated. Therefore, the negative effect of 
upfront reward allocation on effort will be weaker for women. On the other hand, 
men maintain an independent self-construal (Cross & Madson, 1997) and have 
greater agentic tendencies, prioritizing their self-interests and seeking to 
outperform others (Niederle & Vesterlund, 2007). They are more sensitive to equity 
ratios (Major, Bylsma & Cozzarelli, 1989). When rewards are allocated upfront, 
the activation of a market pricing relational model means that men will be more 
likely to stick to these ratios and be less willing to exert additional effort. They seek 
to eliminate violations of the ratio of their effort to the reward they will receive 
relative to their peers. Therefore, the negative effect of upfront reward allocation 
on effort will be stronger for men than for women. I test this hypothesis with the 
data from Study 2. 
Post-Hoc Analyses 
I checked for interaction effects between timing of reward allocation 




relational norms. There was a statistically significant interaction between timing of 
reward allocation and gender composition on communal sharing relational norm (B 
= -.10, SE = .04, p = .03; ΔR2 = .08). To test the effect of the interaction, I conducted 
a simple slopes analysis with all variables mean-centered. Figure 4 illustrates the 
interaction effect. At one standard deviation above the mean of gender composition 
(i.e. more males), the effect of timing of reward allocation on communal sharing 
relational norm was not significant (p = .51). However, at one standard deviation 
below the mean of gender composition (i.e. more females), there was a positive 
effect of timing of reward allocation on communal sharing relational norm (i.e. 
delayed reward allocation led to greater perceived communal sharing relational 
norm), slope = .16, p = .04. Results indicate that there is support for the moderating 
effect of gender on the relationship between timing of team reward allocation and 
communal sharing relational norms.  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, my dissertation extends theory on team rewards and 
relational models theory. Specifically, I found that upfront allocation of team 
rewards was negatively related to cooperation and effort, and has mixed effects on 
conflict. I also found that communal sharing relational norm was positively related 
to cooperation and effort, and negatively related to conflict; market pricing 
relational norm was negatively related to cooperation and effort. Overall, the timing 
of reward allocation proves to be a potentially fruitful line of inquiry that can shed 
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Table 1 Variable Descriptions for Study 1 
Variable Description Survey question 
Timing of Equity 
agreement 
Dummy variable for whether the timing of equity 
agreement was upfront or delayed 
Derived from "At which stage of the venture did your team 
decide how to allocate earnings/equity among the team 
members?", "When did your team FIRST decide how to 
allocate equity among the team members? If idea 
conceptualization is Time 0, approximately how many 
days/weeks/months went by before your team members first 
agreed on the equity split?" and "How did your team decide on 
the allocation? What was the process like? Please briefly 
explain.” 
Equal Splitting Dummy variable for whether all founders received 
equal amount of equity 
Calculated from "Please briefly describe what the INITIAL 
allocation is among your team members in terms of 
percentages.  
Team Size Number of team members who received equity "How many team members in your venture are shareholders?" 
Venture Age 
Number of months that the venture has been in 
operation 
Calculated from "How long has your venture been in operation 
approximately in terms of years and months?" 
Industry 
Dummy variable for industry, which includes: Apps, 
Automotive, Cleaning and Renovation Services, 
Cleantech, Computer software, Construction, 
Consumer, Corporate Team Bonding, Cyber 
Gaming, Digital media & Software, Logistics, 
Ecommerce, Education, Educational Technology, 
Food & Beverage, Fashion, Sports, Health, 
Information Technology, Optics, Tourism, Retail, 






Table 2: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 1     
Variable N M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1. Timing of equity  43 0.37 0.49 ---               
2. Communal sharing  43 5.59 0.74 -.15 (.71)              
3. Market pricing  43 4.09 1.20 .09 -.06 (.80)             
4. Cooperation 43 5.61 0.80 .11 .42** -.27† (.65)            
5. Task Conflict 42 2.94 1.16 .33* -.14 -.16 .03 (.90)           
6. Relationship Conflict 42 2.73 1.10 .35* -.35* .09 -.31* .45** (.89)          
7. Effort 37 5.77 1.19 -.26 .24 -.27 .37* .06 -.12 (.95)         
8. Age 38 31.95 6.70 .04 .18 -.01 .25 -.17 -.24 .09 ---        
9. Gender 38 1.13 0.34 -.14 .18 .02 .19 -.21 -.28 .12 .19 ---       
10. Venture Age 38 30.34 25.14 -.09 -.25 .26 -.03 .06 -.07 -.11 .19 .01 ---      
11. Country  43 1.21 0.41 .08 .30† .18 .14 -.13 .01 .30† .46** .18 -.05 ---     
12. Industry 43 12.79 5.53 -.02 .03 .32* .11 -.09 .05 -.01 .27 .36* .11 .07 ---    
13. Team Size 43 3.04 1.21 .09 -.10 -.38* -.23 .27† .12 -.36* -.03 -.14 .01 -.21 -.21 ---   
14. Equal splitting of equity  42 0.64 0.48 .07 .14 -.07 .10 .16 .14 .15 -.10 -.19 -.04 -.22 .03 -.10 --- 
Note. Coefficient alphas are shown along the diagonal in parentheses. Timing of equity agreement (0=upfront , 1=delayed); Gender (0=female, 
1=male); Country (1=Singapore, 2=India); Equal splitting of equity (0=unequal, 1=equal) 
† p < .10, two-tailed.                                  
* p < .05, two-tailed.                                  







Table 3: Hierarchical Regression of Timing Manipulation on Communal Sharing and Market Pricing Relational Norm for 
Study 1 
    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables   Communal Sharing Market Pricing 
Age 
 
.01 (.02) .01 (.02) .01 (.02) -.05 (.03) -.05† (.03) -.05 (.03) 
Gender 
 
.39 (.40) .33 (.39) .24 (.41) -.60 (.56) -.49 (.54) -.22 (.55) 
Venture Age 
 
-.01 (.01) -.01 (.01) -.01† (.01) .01† (.01) .02* (.01) .02* (.01) 
Country .50 (.35) .51 (.35) .48 (.35) .92† (.49) .89† (.48) .99* (.47) 
Industry 
 
-.002 (.03) .001 (.03) -.003 (.03) .06† (.04) .06 (.04) .06† (.03) 
Team Size .04 (.12) .07 (.12) .08 (.12) -.28† (.16) -.34* (.16) -.36* (.16) 
Equal Split  .38 (.26) .43 (.26) .39 (.27) -.45 (.37) -.54 (.36) -.42 (.36) 
Timing   -.35 (.26) -.38 (.26)  .63† (.36) .70† (.35) 
Timing X Gender   -.66 (.95)   2.03 (1.26) 
R2 
 .23 .28 .29 .39 .45 .50 
ΔR2   
 .05 .01  .06 .05 
F  1.27 1.38 1.26 2.70* 2.91* 3.02* 
Unstandardized coefficients are reported; standard errors are in parentheses. Tests were two tailed (n = 38); † p < .10 * p 





Table 4: Hierarchical Regression of Timing Manipulation on Cooperation, Conflict and Effort   
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Variables Cooperation Task Conflict Relationship Conflict Effort 
Age  .03* (.02) .01 (.02) -.04 (.05) -.05 (.05) -.05 (.05) -.03 (.04) .004 (.03) -.03 (.03) 
Gender  .30 (.39) .04 (.34) -.30 (.65) -.36 (.67) -.80 (.61) -.67 (.57) .27 (.61) -.02 (.57) 
Venture Age  -.003 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01) -.001 (.01) -.004 (.01) -.01 (.01) .001 (.01) 
Country -.11 (.33) -.05 (.31) -.003 (.55) .25  (.60) .56 (.50) .84 (.52) .74 (.54) 1.16* (.53) 
Industry  .01 (.02) .03 (.02) .02 (.04) .03 (.04) .04 (.04) .04 (.04) -.01 (.04) .02 (.04) 
Team Size .01 (.11) -.11 (.10) .36† (.19) .30 (.21) .09 (.17) .11 (.18) -.31 (.19) -.49* (.19) 
Equal Split  .32 (.25) .01 (.24) .37 (.42) .34 (.47) .13 (.38) .37 (.40) .58 (.41) .29 (.41) 
Timing  -.10 (.25) .21 (.23) .55 (.43) .63 (.46) .78* (.38) .63 (.39) -.43 (.42) -.06 (.41) 
Communal Sharing  .38* (.16)  -.16 (.31)  -.53* (.26)  .05 (.27) 
Market Pricing   -.29* (.11)  -.20 (.22)  -.01 (.19)  -.52* (.19) 
R2  .15 .41 .26 .29 .29 .39 .29 .45 
ΔR2   .26  .03  .10  .16 
F  .66 1.90† 1.26 1.08 1.43 1.66 1.37 2.05† 
N   38  37  37  36 









Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Correlations for Study 2 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Timing of reward allocation  0.01 0.82 ---                     
2. Communal sharing relational norm 6.18 0.37 .12 (0.84)                   
3. Market pricing relational norm 4.29 0.62  .19† 0.17 (0.83)                 
4. Cooperation 6.01 0.37 .16 .78** 0.06 (0.65)               
5. Conflict 1.68 0.34 -.26*  -.21* -0.12  -.23* (0.90)             
6. Effort 6.25 0.35  .24* .56** 0.14 .53**  -.30** (0.86)           
7. Age 20.66 0.95 -.15 -.03 0.04 -0.02 0.17 -0.16  ---         
8. Gender Composition 1.16 1.05 -.02 -.04 0.13 -0.01  0.21†  -.21* .67**  ---       
9. Familiarity 1.26 0.36 .10 .00 0.05 -0.09 -0.16 0.04  -0.20† -0.12  ---     
10. Score 42.78 26.56 .03 .30** 0.10 .29** -0.17  0.18† .26* 0.16  -.23*  ---   
11. Equal split of reward  0.91 0.29 .05 -0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.05  -.27* 0.07  --- 
Note. N = 88. Coefficient alphas are shown along the diagonal in parentheses. Correlation values for market pricing relational norm is calculated from 
aggregated data. Timing of reward allocation (-1 = upfront, 0 = control, 1 = delayed). Gender Composition (0 = 3 females, 1 = 1 male 2 females, 2 = 2 
males 1 female, 3 = 3 males). Equal split of reward (1 = equal, 0 = unequal) 
† p < .10, two-tailed.                           
* p < .05, two-tailed.                           






Table 6: Teams Summary by Experimental Conditions in Study 2 
  Delayed Upfront Control 
  M SD N M SD N M SD N 
Age 20.5 0.97 30 20.9 0.89 29 20.6 0.97 29 
Familiarity 1.28 0.27 30 1.18 0.027 29 1.33 0.48 29 
Score 42.17 29.94 30 40.29 26.23 29 45.92 23.63 29 
Equal Split                   
Equal     28     26     26 
Unequal     2     3     3 
Gender Composition                   
3 females     9     9     10 
1 male 2 females     12     9     11 
2 females 1 male     4     7     3 












Figure 1: Timing of Reward Allocation on Market Pricing 
 





Figure 2: Timing of Reward Allocation on Conflict 







Figure 3: Timing of Reward Allocation on Effort 
 





Figure 4: Graph of interaction effect of Gender Composition on relationship 
between Timing of Reward Allocation and Communal Sharing  
Note: Low Gender Composition = low number of males, high number of females 
in team. High Gender Composition = high number of males, low member of 






Appendix 1: Study 1 Measures 
Timing of Equity Agreement 
 
The following questions might be sensitive and confidential. I am interested only 
in finding out how long it took for ventures to talk about equity distributions and 
how people make these decisions. I would like to reassure you that all your 
responses in this research is STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and will only be 
looked at in the aggregated form. Your responses will be coded with numbers and 
averaged across other participants' responses, and your venture name will also be 
replaced with a randomly generated code, so responses will not be tracked to you 
or your venture. Our studies are purely for academic purposes. We do not conduct 
studies on behalf of private companies. 
1. At which stage of the venture did your team decide how to allocate 
earnings/equity among the team members? 
 
2. When did your team FIRST decide how to allocate equity among the team 
members? If idea conceptualization is Time 0, approximately how many 
days/weeks/months went by before your team members first agreed on the 
equity split? 
 
3. How did your team decide on the allocation? What was the process like? 
Please briefly explain. 
Market Pricing Relational Norm 
 
The statements below describe the norms of your team.  Please use the scale 
provided to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statements 
1. What benefits each team member gets from this team is directly 
proportional to how much effort they give to the team. 
 
2. This team divides things up according to how much each member pays or 
contributes. 
 
3. If one of us worked for the other, we would be paid in proportion to how 
long we worked or how much we did. 
 
4. We have a right (we are entitled) to a fair rate of return for what we put 





5. With this team, each team member makes decisions according to the ratio 
of the benefits to themselves and the costs to themselves. 
 
6. Each team member expects to get the same rate of return on effort and 
investment that other team members get. 
 
7. Our interaction is strictly rational: we each calculate what our payoffs are, 
and act accordingly. 
Communal Sharing Relational Norm 
 
The statements below describe the norms of your team.  Please use the scale 
provided to indicate how much you agree or disagree with the statements. 
1. If either member needs something, someone gives it without expecting 
anything in return. 
 
2. Many important things we use belong to the team together, not to either 
member separately. 
 
3. We share many important responsibilities jointly, without assigning them 
to anyone alone. 
 
4. We feel a moral obligation to feel kind and compassionate to each other. 
 
5. We make decisions together by consensus. 
 
6. The team developed very similar attitudes and values. 
 
7. We feel that we have something unique in common that makes all team 
members essentially the same. 
 





Please use the scale provided to answer the following questions describing your 
teamwork experience in your venture so far. 
1. It is important for us to maintain harmony within the team. 
2. There is very little collaboration among team members, tasks are 
individually delineated. 
 




4. People are willing to sacrifice their self-interest for the benefit of the team. 
5. There is a high level of sharing between team members. 
Relationship Conflict 
Please use the scale provided to answer the following questions describing your 
teamwork experience in your venture so far. 
1. How much relationship tension was there in your team? 
2. How often did people get angry in your team? 
3. How much emotional conflict was there among members in your team? 
Task Conflict 
Please use the scale provided to answer the following questions describing your 
teamwork experience in your venture so far. 
1. How much conflict of ideas was there in your team? 
2. How frequently did you have disagreements within your team about the 
task you were working on? 
 
3. How often did people in your team have conflicting opinions regarding the 
task you were working on? 
 
4. How often were there disagreements about who should do what in your 
team? 
 









Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements describing your 
team members’ behavior in the team. 
Team member: XXX 
1. This team member work as hard as he/she can to achieve the team’s 
objectives 
2. This team member carries a fair share of his/her overall work load 
3. This team member makes an effort to attain high team performance levels 
4. Even when experiencing setbacks, this team member try to the best of 
his/her ability to realize team goals 
 
5. This team member goes out of his/her way to accomplish team objectives, 



























Appendix 2: Study 2 Measures 
Market Pricing Relational Norm 
Recall your experience in the team task that you just engaged in. The following 
statements can be used to describe your perceptions about the norms and values 
that guide the behaviors in your team. Please indicate to what extent you agree 
with the statements describing your team during the process of the team task. 
1. What benefits each team member gets from this team is directly 
proportional to how much effort they give to the team. 
 
2. This team divides things up according to how much each member pays or 
contributes. 
 
3. If one of us worked for the other, we would be paid in proportion to how 
long we worked or how much we did. 
 
4. We have a right (we are entitled) to a fair rate of return for what we put 
into this interaction. 
 
5. With this team, each team member makes decisions according to the ratio 
of the benefits to themselves and the costs to themselves. 
 
6. Each team member expects to get the same rate of return on effort and 
investment that other team members get. 
 
7. Our interaction is strictly rational: we each calculate what our payoffs are, 
and act accordingly. 
 
Communal Sharing Relational Norm 
 
Recall your experience in the team task that you just engaged in. The following 
statements can be used to describe your perceptions about the norms and values 
that guide the behaviors in your team. Please indicate to what extent you agree 
with the statements describing your team during the process of the team task. 
1. If either member needs something, someone gives it without expecting 
anything in return. 
 






3. We share many important responsibilities jointly, without assigning them 
to anyone alone. 
 
4. We feel a moral obligation to feel kind and compassionate to each other. 
 
5. We make decisions together by consensus. 
 
6. The team developed very similar attitudes and values. 
7. We feel that we have something unique in common that makes all team 
members essentially the same. 
8. The team is a unit: everyone belongs together. 
Cooperation 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the statements describing how your 
team behaved during the process of the team task. 
1. It is important for us to maintain harmony within the team. 
2. There is very little collaboration among team members, tasks are 
individually delineated. 
3. There is a high level of cooperation between team members. 
4. People are willing to sacrifice their self-interest for the benefit of the team. 
5. There is a high level of sharing between team members. 
Task Conflict 
 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the statements describing the 
behaviors of your team during the process of the team task. 
1. How much conflict of ideas was there in your team? 
2. How frequently did you have disagreements within your team about the 
task you were working on? 
 
3. How often did people in your team have conflicting opinions regarding the 





4. How often were there disagreements about who should do what in your 
team? 
 
5. How much conflict was there in your team about task responsibilities? 
Effort 
 
Please indicate how much you agree with the following statements describing 
your team members’ behavior in the team task.  
Team Member: XXX 
1. This team member work as hard as he/she can to achieve the team’s 
objectives 
 
2. This team member carries a fair share of his/her overall work load 
3. This team member makes an effort to attain high team performance levels 
4. Even when experiencing setbacks, this team member try to the best of 
his/her ability to realize team goals 
 
5. This team member goes out of his/her way to accomplish team objectives, 
even when others are taking it easy 
 
